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1 Introduction
The institutional arrangements that shape access to land are central to the functioning of an
agricultural economy. Moreover, since a large fraction of the world’s poor remain dependent on
agriculture, production relations in this sector potentially have a first-order impact on aggregate
poverty.1 Accordingly, it is not surprising that policymakers all over the world have frequently
intervened to regulate the terms on which land can be transacted. However, in large part due
to data constraints, little is known about the long-run impact of regulated land markets.
Improving the efficiency of resource allocation is a central theme in economic development
(Ray 1998). In the case of land, institutions introduced (or strengthened) by colonial powers
frequently led to a significant concentration of land ownership and significant elite capture of
policy-making. In conjunction with imperfections in other key markets (e.g., the market for
credit), these inequalities continue to constrain long run economic growth and, in particular,
the transfer of land towards high return activities (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001, Bin-
swanger, Deininger & Feder 1995, Banerjee & Iyer 2005, Pande & Udry 2006).2 for an overview
of the importance of credit market imperfections in development. As increasing demand for
land from the industrial sector has clashed with often inefficient inherited institutions in many
countries, most notably India and China, intense debates have emerged around whether and
how governments should regulate the terms on which land can be acquired from landowners
and tenants (Ghatak & Mookherjee 2011).
These debates are not new. Given the potential mismatch between relatively stagnant
institutions and rapidly evolving demand, government regulation of land transactions is, un-
surprisingly, common. In most cases, land reform, when implemented, is partial: agricultural
tenants or others that work land receive incomplete property rights (Lipton 2009). In a second-
best world, however, there is no guarantee that such regulation produces gains for all groups
even if there is greater overall efficiency.3
Examining the long-run impact of existing land reform policies in specific contexts can thus
provide important insights on the potential welfare implications of policies that seek to promote
efficient land use. In this spirit, this paper studies the long-run impact of tenancy reforms in
India which, following Independence, witnessed a wave of state-level reforms (Appu 1996). The
major period of reform in the four Southern Indian states examined here (Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) began shortly after Independence and continued until the
early 1970s. We exploit village-level and household data to trace the impact of reforms which
took place more than thirty years prior to our survey, allowing us to examine a number of
dimensions in which we could expect tenancy reform to have a long-run impact.
Theoretically, landlords can choose between different ways of exploiting their land to gener-
ate a return, including selling land and investing in other assets. The attractiveness of operating
1There is a classic view, formalized in Matsuyama (1992) which argues that produtivity improvements in
agriculture are a spur to industrial development since they increase the demand for industrial goods.
2See, for example, Banerjee (2003)
3The complexity of designing partial reform in a second-best world is a long-standing theme in the development
literature – see, for example, Stiglitz (1988) for a discussion.
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land when tenants have stronger user rights depends on the extent to which landlords can extract
returns from doing so, while the ability to sell land depends on the capital market opportunities
of potential owner-cultivators. Tenancy reforms make renting out land less attractive to land-
lords. We, therefore, expect less use of tenancy and more land sales, particularly to those with
superior credit market opportunities. This will lead, in turn, to a change in the distribution
of land ownership. If frictions in the land market allow landowners to extract only part of the
surplus created in a land sale, sales will occur only to relatively high productivity individuals.
Thus, by leading to more efficient land use, land sales will increase labor demand and hence the
agricultural wage.
Tracing through these equilibrium effects complicates the overall welfare impact. Those
cultivators who remain as tenants will gain, but marginal tenants will lose out as they become
landless laborers. However, their opportunities in the labor market should improve. Households
with better capital market opportunities are more likely to end up as owner-cultivators. These
are the predictions that we bring to the data.
The paper exploits two sources of variation to identify the impact of tenancy reform. First,
we exploit a natural experiment arising out of the 1956 reorganization of state boundaries in
southern India which was designed to transform the often illogical state units inherited from the
British into linguistically coherent states. During this reorganization, regions of similar linguistic
and cultural characteristics were divided by newly drawn state borders, and the districts thus
created were assigned to different states. These districts, analogous both in historical experience
and social structure, subsequently experienced significantly different programs of land reform.
We choose a set of subdistricts or blocks within each pair of bordering districts that are matched
on linguistic characteristics. The key identifying assumption is that the assignment of different
blocks to different states along the border is quasi-random, i.e., the drawing of the border was
not dictated by any political or economic criteria. If this assumption holds, estimating the
impact of land reform within these block pairs allows for an unbiased estimate of the impact of
land reform on economic outcomes.4
Second, we examine whether the impact of tenancy reform varies with households’ (likely)
land ownership status prior to the reform. Here, we exploit the fact that, on average, a house-
hold’s caste is a historical predictor of its land ownership status. This view is argued, for
example, by Shah (2004) and we provide evidence to support it in Section 4.2). At indepen-
dence, India’s land ownership structure largely mirrored the hierarchical social structure defined
by the Hindu caste system. The large landowners typically came from the upper castes. The
middle and lower castes were peasants who typically worked as tenants on reasonable sized plots
(often grouped as Other Backward Castes (OBCs)) while the lowest castes and tribal households
(grouped as Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST)) were agricultural laborers or sharecroppers
with weak tenancy rights.
Our results show that tenancy reform did reduce land inequality within villages, predomi-
nantly by transferring land from upper caste landowners to middle caste tenants. However, in
4These outcomes were measured in a survey designed by the authors and implemented in 2002.
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line with the theory, tenancy reform also increased the number of landless SC/ST households,
a group that is likely to have had poorer access to credit. Thus increased equity was achieved
primarily via the transfer of land from the upper to the middle castes.
Consistent with our model, we find that this reallocation of landholdings led to a higher
agricultural wage after tenancy reform. However, this was not sufficient to counterbalance the
negative effects of increased landlessness for scheduled caste households, on average the poorest
groups in these rural communities. We estimate that the net impact of tenancy reform on the
welfare of the SC/ST group as measured by assets owned to be negative. This serves as a
reminder of the difficulty of implementing well-intentioned reform in a second-best environment
where a Pareto improvement is unlikely even if there are output gains.
Our findings offer an insight into the distributional effects that are central to discussions
of the political economy of reform by providing micro-evidence on how partial land reform
differentially creates winners and losers. Recent studies of the political economy economy of
land reform highlight the conflicts of interest generated by these differential effects. For example,
Bardhan & Mookherjee (2010) evaluate the political determinants of land reform at the local
level in West Bengal and find evidence that the intensity of political competition (rather than
party ideology) appears to be the primary relevant causal factor. This suggests that land reform
is primarily driven by parties’ incentives to win votes from its potential beneficiaries. Similarly,
for Mexico, de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro & Sadoulet (2011) argue that the left-wing party
favored partial land reform over full land reform as it helped maintain a sufficiently large voter
base of relatively poor voters. Further evidence from India analyzed by Anderson, Francois &
Kotwal (2011) suggests that high-caste landowners exploit their tenancy relationships to sustain
their political power by maintaining clientelistic vote trading networks with their workers.
By documenting the pattern of gainers and losers, our study provides some evidence that
is helpful in studying these political economy issues. Whether voters are able to accurately
evaluate the general equilibrium responses to policy reform could potentially have a significant
impact on their political support of such reforms.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on the natural experiment,
the history of land reform in southern India and the data employed. Section 3 lays out a
theoretical framework which we use to generate predictions about tenancy reform which we
take to the data. Section 4 introduces the data and discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5
provides the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
In this section we provide three types of background information relevant for our analysis. First,
we describe the state reorganization that we exploit to create our natural experiment. Second,
we outline the tenancy reforms that we will analyze. Third, we consider existing evidence on
the effects of tenancy reform.
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2.1 State Reorganization in India
At the founding of India in 1949, its administrative structure reflected the history of expansion
of the British East India Company and subsequently the British colonial government over the
subcontinent. Southern India was comprised of five states.5
In the post-independence period, a movement grew to redraw state borders along linguistic
lines in order to create more coherent linguistically unified states. Based on the recommenda-
tions of a national commission, South India was divided into four linguistically unified states
in 1956: Andhra Pradesh (AP), a largely Telugu-speaking state, was created from Hyderabad
and the Telugu-majority areas of the Madras presidency. Karnataka (KA), intended to be pre-
dominantly Kannada-speaking, was created by the merger of Mysore and Kannada-speaking
areas of Hyderabad and the Madras and Bombay presidencies. Kerala (KE), predominantly
Mayalayam-speaking, composed the princely states of Travancore and Cochin and parts of the
Madras presidency. Tamil-majority areas of the Madras presidency constituted the new state of
Tamil Nadu (TN). Districts were assigned to states mainly on the basis of the majority language
spoken, but also in order to fairly assign valuable cities and ports, reasoning that was explained
in great detail in the report produced by the commission (Manager of Publications 1955). Figure
1 shows the borders of the new south Indian states overlaid on the previous state borders.
The state reorganization commission largely kept the sub-state administrative units of dis-
tricts and blocks (the unit under districts) unchanged. It identified configurations of linguis-
tically similar and geographically contiguous districts that would form a state. In some cases
blocks were reassigned across districts. Inevitably, on the borders of the new states, there were a
number of cases in which two blocks with similar climate, geography and linguistic composition
were separated into different states. Moreover, a number of these block pairs were previously
part of the same state and possessed a shared political and administrative history. Our iden-
tification strategy exploits the presence of such block pairs, under the assumption that shared
history and linguistic or caste structure renders one block within the pair an appropriate control
group for the other.
2.2 Tenancy Reform in India
The Indian constitution decreed that land policy was a state subject, and soon after indepen-
dence states began enacting land reforms. The bulk of state-level land reform was concentrated
between 1950 and 1972. They included three main initiatives – abolition of intermediaries,
tenancy reform and land ceilings. In Appendix Table 1 we list the tenancy reforms undertaken
by states in our sample, based on Besley & Burgess (2000).
From an institutional perspective, there are several reasons to focus on tenancy reform.
5Hyderabad and Mysore had been princely states under British rule, governed by local rulers with indirect
colonial control via a British resident. Hyderabad had originated as the territory of a Mughal governor who
established control over part of the empire’s territory in the Deccan plateau. Mysore emerged out of the defeat
of the kingdom of Tipu Sultan in the early 19th century. Travancore and Cochin were progressive princely states
located on the southwest coast. The remainder of south India was directly ruled under the Madras presidency,
with its capital in Madras.
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First, the British land management system had made tenancy ubiquitous across India, with
the typical tenancy arrangement oral and terminable at will. Thus, in practice it appears that
the most effective land reform measures in India were not directly redistributive measures, but
tenancy reforms that affect the relations between the landlord and the tenant or, in some cases,
render tenancy illegal (Eashvaraiah 1985, Herring 1991).
Second, the design of tenancy laws implied that their impact would vary with a house-
hold’s initial tenurial security and access to credit. In almost every state, tenancy laws granted
landowners rights of resumption for “personal cultivation.” Tenants who remained on non-
resumable tenanted land were eligible for ownership rights. In setting the land price, states
either directly established a price or on occasion subsidized the market price. These laws also
typically restricted the creation of future tenancies. Of our four sample states, Kerala prohibited
tenancy while Karnataka and part of Andhra only allowed it in limited cases. Tamil Nadu and
the Andhra area of Andhra Pradesh placed no restrictions on future tenancy. However, even in
the last case provisions on maximum rent and tenants’ rights to purchase land disincentivized
tenancy arrangements (Appu 1996).
2.3 Existing Evidence
There is now a sizeable literature on the effects of land reform in general and tenancy reform
in particular. Traditional macro accounts of development have often emphasized the appro-
priate organization of the agricultural sector as a precondition for development. To that end,
Rodrik (1995) argues that land reform in Taiwan and Korea were important in creating the
preconditions for their development paths.
There is a large literature on land reform in India, with much of the case-study literature
referenced in Besley & Burgess (2000). Village-level studies have tended to offer a mixed
assessment of the poverty impact of different land reforms in general and tenancy reforms
in particular. However, a number of quantitative studies in India produce more promising
findings. For example, Banerjee, Gertler & Ghatak (2002) combine theory and data to study
Operation Barga, a program which encouraged tenancy registration in West Bengal. They find
that this program of tenancy reform lead to significant increases in agricultural productivity. A
subsequent paper on land reform in West Bengal found that while the direct effect of land reform
was inequality-reducing, this effect is insignificant relative to the inequality-increasing effect of
household division, migration and land market transactions (Bardhan, Luca, Mookherjee &
Pino 2011).
There is also a broader literature that uses variation in land reform across different regions of
India to estimate its effect. Using cross-state evidence, Besley & Burgess (2000) find significant
correlations between land reform and poverty reduction. Conning & Robinson (2007) focus on
the heterogeneous effects of land reform due to the underlying structure of production relations.
They combine theory and evidence at the state level for India, postulating a model that predicts
a decline in tenancy rates and presenting evidence that tenancy rates did fall as a result of land
reform. Ghatak & Roy (2007) use cross-state evidence and find land reform had no impact on
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land inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient and a negative impact on productivity, but
argue there is considerable heterogeneity among states.
There is also widespread evidence that, as we argue here, capital market imperfections
play an important role in determining the structure of land markets and the impact of policy
reforms on that structure. A basic empirical regularity indicative of the prevalence of these
imperfections is the persistence of large land plots despite the well-documented negative land
size-productivity relationship (Ray 1998). This suggests that capital market frictions prevent
landowners from extracting the full surplus from the sale of their land and thus inhibit sales
that would otherwise be optimal. Other evidence supporting this hypothesis includes the fact
that the average land sale is a distress sale, thus creating a market for lemons problem that
inhibits efficient sales(Rosenzweig & Binswanger 1993). Finally, the land sale price often ex-
cludes the collateral value of land as buyers may have to mortgage land in order to purchase
it (Binswanger, Deininger & Feder 1993, Deininger & Binswanger 1999). This leads potential
buyers to undervalue the land, rendering the land market even thinner.
3 Conceptual Framework
We develop a model which motivates our empirical specification. As argued above, the tenancy
reforms can best be conceptualized as strengthening the rights of tenants. To capture the
impact of this in theory, we develop a model which features landowners lacking skill to farm
land directly and thus choosing whether to sell or rent their land. We consider the impact of
a reform which allows tenants to capture a larger fraction of the surplus generated by land.
While this makes tenants better off, landowners may choose to sell more land and this can have
an effect on patterns of land ownership, labor demand and wages.
3.1 Basics
There are three groups comprising a population: a measure pi of landlords who owns all of the
land and two groups of potential cultivators. The landlords own a measure L < 1 of land which
we assume cannot be farmed directly, and land ownership is uniform among the landlord class.
The technology matches one unit of land to one cultivator. We normalize the size of the group
of cultivators to one.
The first group of cultivators, a fraction γ, have access to the capital market or some other
form of wealth so that they can offer to buy land. In our data, this group will mainly comprise
OBC households, but it could include some SC/ST households. The second group of cultivators,
a fraction of (1− γ), cannot buy land but can be taken on as tenants.
Whether as a tenant or an owner, a cultivator can employ labor on the land to generate
output:
θ
1
η
`η
where η < 1 and θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] is an idiosyncratic productivity parameter which can be thought of
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as a cultivator’s ability or access to relevant human capital. For simplicity, we assume that the
distribution of ability is the same in each farmer group and denote this by G (θ).
Labor can be hired in a competitive labor market at a wage of w. It is supplied by cultivators
who are neither tenants nor owners; there is always such a group since we have assumed that
L < 1.
Let:
pi (θ, w) = arg max
`
{
θ
1
η
`η − w`
}
=
1
η
θ
1
1−ηw
− η
1−η .
be the surplus generated by the land. Note that labor demand for a type θ cultivator is
(w/θ)
− 1
1−η .
The model has two frictions which are reasonable for the developing agricultural economy
that we are studying. While these could be given micro-foundations, the added complication is
not worth this investment given our interest here.6 First, we suppose that a landlord can earn a
share α of the surplus generated by a tenant. Think of this as capturing the relative bargaining
power of landlords and tenants.7 Second, capital markets are imperfect, making it feasible for
purchasers of land to pay only a fraction β of the surplus created by the land if they buy it.8 A
key ratio in the model is α/β, denoting the relative ability of landlords to extract surplus from
tenants versus owner-cultivators. We work throughout with the case where α/β > 1.9 This
is the case where capital market imperfections are in an appropriate sense more extreme than
rental market imperfections from a landlord point of view. But, all else equal, those who can
access capital to buy land would be better off by doing so.
3.2 Equilibrium
We are interested in two equilibrium decisions. First, the landlord decides how to divide his
land between parcels to sell and parcels to rent out. Second, the labor market equilibrium
determines the wage given this decision.
The landlord will decide how much land to rent out and how much to sell based on the
ability of the farmer. Define from
θˆ (x) =
(
α
β
) 1
1−η
x ≡ φx
6The main convenience lies in the way that we are separating efficiency and distribution. We are supposing
that the same agricultural surplus is created by both tenants and owner-cultivators. Institutions affect only how
it is distributed. In a classic tenancy model, there is a trade-off between rent extraction and efficiency under
tenancy.
7In a Nash bargaining solution, α corresponds precisely to the share of the surplus that the tenant can earn
in the event of disagreement.
8The parameter β corresponds exactly to the fraction of the surplus that can be credibly pledged to landlords
and/or suppliers of credit.
9There is no reason to believe that this is always the case. In the current set-up, it generates the prediction
below that wages increase when α/β falls. More generally, we would expect contracts to have efficiency effects on
production with owner-cultivate land being more efficiently operated because owners become residual claimants.
This would tend to reinforce the effects here and could be more modeled albeit at the price of introducing greater
complexity.
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as the level of productivity that makes a landlord indifferent between selling and renting to
a tenant of productivity level x.10 Our assumption that α/β > 1, implies that φ > 1 so that
θˆ (x) > x. This implies that the marginal cultivator who buys land will be more productive
than the marginal tenant. This is because capital market imperfections make surplus extraction
from selling more difficult than from renting.
The landlord will sell some land and rent some land. Since he is assumed to be unable to
directly farm any land, the least productive tenant who farms land, x, is defined from:
L = [1−G (φx)] γ + (1− γ) [1−G (x)] . (1)
The first expression here is the land that is sold while the second is land that is rented. All the
most productive cultivators farm land and the least productive are labourers. Note that:
∂x
∂φ
= − g (φx)xγ
[γg (φx)φ+ (1− γ) g (x)] < 0. (2)
Observe also using (2) that ∂ (φx) /∂φ > 0. This says that the more that can extracted from
tenants relative to sellers, the lower the productivity of the marginal tenant that is given land.
The productivity gap between the marginal tenant and marginal owner cultivator also increases.
This is because there is a switch towards tenants and away from selling the land.
The equilibrium wage solves:
1− L = γ
∫ θ¯
φx
−piw (θ, w) dG (θ) + (1− γ)
∫ θ¯
x
−piw (θ, w) dG (θ) (3)
= w
− 1
1−η θ˜ (φ, x) , (4)
where θ˜ (φ, x) =
[
γ
∫ θ¯
φx θ
1
1−η dG (θ) + (1− γ) ∫ θ¯x θ 11−η dG (θ)] . For future reference, observe that
dθ˜ (φ, x)
dφ
=
∂θ˜ (φ, x)
∂φ
+
∂θ˜ (φ, x)
∂x
· ∂x
∂φ
(5)
= − g (φx) g (x) γ (1− γ)
[γg (φx)φ+ (1− γ) g (x)]x
(
1+ 1
1−η
)
[φ− 1] < 0 .
This says that an increase in φ, which favors tenancy, will reduce the average productivity of
land that is cultivated so long as φ > 1.
An equilibrium is a pair (x∗ (φ) , w∗ (φ)) which solves (1) and (3). To explore the effects of
tenancy reform, we are interested in how these depend on φ.
10It is derived from
βpi
(
θˆ (x) , w
)
= αpi (x,w) .
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3.3 Tenancy Reform
We now consider what happens when there is a reform that makes tenancy less attractive. We
model this as a reduction in φ due to α having fallen. In other words, tenancy reform makes
surplus extraction from tenants relatively more difficult.
The model makes a number of predictions about the impact of this shift on landholding and
wages. They can be summarized as follows.
Model Predictions: Suppose that tenancy reform reduces φ. The model predicts the following
equilibrium responses:
1. An increase in landholding among the sub-group of the population with better capital
market opportunities.
2. A reduction in tenancy.
3. An increase in the agricultural wage.
All of these effects of tenancy reform follow intuitively from the analysis above. By mak-
ing tenancy less attractive, landlords sell more land to the group of cultivators who have the
resources to purchase land. Since the marginal owner-cultivator is more productive (given our
assumption that φ > 1), this increases labor demand and hence increases the agricultural wage
which clears the labor market.
The model can be used to explore the impact of tenancy reform on land inequality. A
fraction
βL (φ) ≡ [(1− γ) + γG (φx
∗ (φ))]
1 + pi
are landless among whom (1−γ)[1−G(x
∗(φ))]
1+pi are tenants. A fraction
pi+γ(1−G(φx∗(φ)))
1+pi of the
population owns land. This can be decomposed into a fraction of owner-cultivators:
βC (φ) ≡ γ (1−G (φx
∗ (φ)))
1 + pi
which is decreasing in φ. The size of the landlord group remains fixed at pi and, assuming that
they sell land in equal numbers, their share of the land is:
[1− γ [1−G (φx∗ (φ))]]
pi
which is increasing in φ.
Putting this together, it is straightforward to see that a reduction in φ leads to a new land
distribution which Lorenz dominates the initial distribution. Hence, a wide variety of inequality
measures, such as the Gini coefficient, should show a reduction in land inequality after tenancy
reform.
To map the model further onto the data, note that we expect caste membership to map
crudely onto our two cultivator sub-groups. Specifically, suppose that γ = γSC/ST +γOBC , then
we would expect that γOBC > γSC/ST . While land ownership should rise in both groups, we
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expect this to be a larger effect for OBCs. Moreover, reductions in tenancy should be larger
for the SC/ST group with a greater increase in participation as agricultural laborers. Land
inequality between castes may increase as result of tenancy reform since OBC households will
benefit disproportionately. Average income among the cultivator group J is:
µJ (φ) = w
∗ (φ) [γJG (φx∗ (φ)) + (1− γJ)G (x∗ (φ))]
+
β
η
[w∗ (φ)]−
η
1−η
[
γJ
∫ θ¯
φx∗(φ)
θ
1
1−η dG (θ) + φ (1− γJ)
∫ θ¯
x∗(φ)
θ
1
1−η dG (θ)
]
.
The effect of a reduction in φ is ambiguous in sign for each group when groups differ in γJ .
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
Our analysis makes use of multiple datasets. We describe these below and then provide a
justification for our empirical strategy.
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Tenancy Reform Data
The core method for identifying tenancy reforms follows Besley & Burgess (2000). Data on
tenancy reform in southern India before and after the states’ reorganization report is assembled
from a variety of historical sources. Appendix Table 2 provides a summary of the number of
tenancy reforms before and after the states’ reorganization in 1956 in the sampled districts and
Appendix Table 3 lists the dates and provisions of tenancy reforms.
This definition of land reform assumes that each piece of legislation represents a separate
land reform event presumed to have an additional, cumulative impact on land distribution.
The primary analysis here employs a count index of tenancy reforms; however, we obtain very
similar results using an index of tenancy reform where we directly index relevant provisions.11
4.1.2 Household and Village Survey
Our sampling procedure started by selecting nine boundary districts, four pairs that were in
the same princely state prior to 1956 and two pairs that were not (for details, see Appendix).12
Within a district pair we matched blocks on the basis of linguistic similarity. The matching of
blocks was done using a language match index based on 1991 census data on the proportion
11In order to compile the alternative index of land reform, we compile a list of all provisions included in
land reform events over this period, and assign each district a dummy variable for whether or not the district
experienced this type of reform. The total score for tenancy reforms is the sum of these dummy variables. The
indexed provisions are as follows: minimum terms of lease; right of purchase of nonresumable lands; the right to
mortgage land for credit; mandatory recording of tenant names; limitations on the landlord’s right of resumption;
caps on rent; temporary protection against eviction or prohibition of eviction; prohibition of eviction for public
trusts; establishing a system of processing land titles; extending formal tenancy to more classes of tenants; and
granting tenants full ownership rights.
12Three adjacent districts (Kolar, Chittoor and Dharmapur) are compared pairwise. Thus in total, there are
six districts that generate three separate pairs, and these three districts yield three additional more pairs.
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of the population speaking each one of the eighteen languages reported spoken in the region;
details on its calculation and summary statistics are reported in the Appendix.
The goal of the language match index is to identify pairs of blocks (on either side of state
boundary) where the difference across blocks in proportion population speaking each language
was minimized. Within a district pair, we selected the three independent pairs of blocks that
were the best matches in terms of linguistic similarity. This yields 18 matched pairs of blocks
(three pairs of blocks for each of six pairs of districts). The match quality indices for these
block pairs are, on average, one and a half standard deviations lower (i.e., a closer match) than
the mean.
Our outcome variables come from a series of interlinked surveys conducted in the sampled
villages in 2002. We use two key elements of the survey. The first is data collected in 522
villages at a village-wide participatory rural appraisal (PRA) meeting at which attendees were
asked to provide information about the caste and land structure in their villages, including
the name of all castes represented and whether they were SC/ST, the number of households
that belong to each caste, and the number of households falling into each one of a number of
landowning categories. The same meeting was also used to obtain information from villagers
about prevailing agricultural and construction wages. This methodology has been previously
used to collect village-level data in other studies of local governance in India (Chattopadhyay
& Duflo 2004, Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande & Topalova 2009).
The second dataset used is a household survey which was collected in a randomly selected
subset of the sampled villages in each block. Twenty household surveys were collected in each of
259 villages. Households were randomly selected, with the requirement that at least four of the
sampled households were required to be SC/ST households. This results in a total sample of 5180
households. The household survey collects data on familial structure, occupation, landholdings,
and assets, as well as political knowledge and participation. The household and PRA surveys
are the principal source of data for this dataset.13
The household dataset is linked to landholding data at the block and village level drawn from
the 1951 census. The 1951 census reported the number of households in each of a number of
land-owning/occupational categories (landlords, independent cultivators, tenants and landless
laborers) by village; 302 of the 522 villages in our sample can be matched to villages in this
census, while the remainder have names that have changed and cannot be matched. The data
is also linked to the 1961 census, which provided data on the proportion of households that are
SC/ST; 316 villages are matched to the 1961 data.
Land distribution data by village was collected in PRA meetings, where the assembled
villagers were asked to name each caste in the village, and the number of households in that
caste that held no land, between 0 and 1 acres of land, 1 to 5 acres, 5 to 10 acres, 10 to 25
acres, or 25 or more acres. The Gini and GE coefficients were calculated by assuming that each
household in a given category possessed the mean amount of land (e.g., a household holding
13Information on number of factories in the village and surrounding areas was collected in a follow-up survey
with key village informants in 2003.
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between 1 and 5 acres is assumed to hold three acres.)14 We use these data to construct a variety
of land distribution measures: the Gini coefficient, generalized entropy measures of inequality
with α equal to 1, the ratios of total land held by percentiles 90/10 and percentiles 75/25 and
the proportion of landless households. All capture land distribution in slightly different ways
and, below, we check that the results are broadly consistent across different measures.
4.2 Identification Strategy
We will exploit variation in tenancy reform experiences across villages and social groups to
identify the effect of reforms. A key challenge to identification in this analysis is establishing
the validity of the quasi-experiment evident in the swapping of districts and blocks therein. Our
analysis compares blocks in neighboring districts assigned to different states post-1956 that are
relatively similar with respect to linguistic characteristics. The first step is to verify that the
assignment of border regions to a given state is not driven by observable characteristics of those
regions, and thus the assignment of different blocks to different states can be considered quasi-
random. More specifically, we want to ensure that the assignment of blocks to states cannot be
interpreted as an attempt to create a state more amenable to any particular policy agenda.
As a prelude to this, we use occupational data from the 1951 Census (i.e., before the state
reorganization) for a subsample of villages that could be identified in the census to provide three
checks on this strategy. First, we show that assignment of border blocks to a given state was
quasi-random in that it was not correlated with land ownership patterns. Let x1951,ip be the
proportion of the population engaged in agriculture in the village in 1951 that falls into each
of the denoted occupational categories: agricultural laborer, tenant, self-cultivator, tenant, and
non-cultivating landlord. We estimate the following equation, omitting the landlord category.
Rip denotes the number of tenancy reforms in village i of pair p post-1956 and γp block-pair
fixed effects; all specifications include robust standard errors.
Rip = β1Laborerip + β2Tenantip + β3Cultip + γp
Table 1 column (1) reports the results. The size of each landholding class is uniformly
insignificant, and generally with high p-values. There is no evidence that villages with different
landholding and tenancy structures are systematically assigned to states with differing levels of
land reform, within a given block-pair. This supports our claim that the assignment of blocks
to states cannot be interpreted as an attempt to create a state more amenable to any particular
land reform agenda. Employing block-pair fixed effects, assignment to states can be considered
quasi-experimental.
Next, we examine the quality of land match between block pairs within district pairs of
interest. Our null hypothesis is that matching blocks on language should also generate sim-
ilarity in caste and land structure. Given the absence of micro-level caste data prior to the
reorganization, we restrict our test to land structure.
14Accordingly, they represent a lower bound on the true level of inequality, as the measures assume no dispersion
within categories of landholding. The full definitions of both measures are provided in the Appendix.
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We employ the same 1951 landlessness data, here at the village level and use a variant of the
matching procedure employed for language. First, we create all possible matches between all
522 villages. We drop matches between villages in the same state, leaving only pairings across
state lines. Some of these village pairs lie within the actual block pairs matched along linguistic
lines, and some do not. We want to test whether the average difference in the percentage
landless between villages in the matched block pairs is less than the average difference across
all possible pairs of villages. We estimate the following equation, where Samei,j is an indicator
variable equal to one when the villages are in a matched block-pair and zero otherwise. µsi,sj
is a dummy variable for matches between the states of village i and village j.
Difi,j = βSamei,j + µsi,sj (6)
Results from the estimation of this equation are displayed in the second column of Table
1. On average village pairs within matched blocked pairs are more similar than those not in
matched pairs, with the difference in landless proportions about 11% less than the mean.
Thus, our matching identifies block pairs that are similar in both language and land struc-
ture. 15
Finally, our conceptual framework defined two groups of cultivators differentiated by the
fact that only one has access to capital to buy land. In the data it is impossible to differentiate
households by their pre-land reform land or asset status; the only indicator of class is caste
membership, presumed to be unchanging. Accordingly, in order to test the model predictions
about the impact of land reform on different classes of tenants, we assume that tenants with
access to capital are members of the OBC caste-group, while those without access to capital
are primarily SC/ST.
We can substantiate this assumption by employing data on landowning classes from the
pre-reform 1951 census. Unfortunately, caste information is unavailable in that year’s census;
however, the 1961 census includes data on the proportion of SC/ST and non-SC/ST households
in each village. Accordingly, we can test whether there is a positive (negative) correlation
between the 1951 proportion of agricultural laborers (tenants, self-cultivators, landlords) and
the 1961 proportion of SC/ST households. We regress the proportion of the population that is
SC/ST on each landholding category, including block-pair fixed effects.
SCST1961,ip = βx1951,ip + γp
The results are shown in columns (3)-(6) of Table 1. The proportion of SC/ST is posi-
tively correlated with the proportion of agricultural laborers, uncorrelated with the proportion
of tenants, and negatively correlated with the proportion of owner-cultivators. Thus among the
non-landlord class, SC/ST are more likely to be agricultural laborers than their OBC counter-
15There are, of course, residual inter-block differences in land ownership structure in each block pair. Given
the existing evidence on the persistent long-term effects of land ownership structure (Banerjee & Iyer 2005), one
potential concern is that the differences we measure simply reflect these initial differences. However, we also
estimate our primary equations of interest controlling for initial conditions and the results are consistent. This
suggests the results do not reflect different initial conditions.
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parts, and less likely to be owner-cultivators.
We can also test the assumption about access to capital more directly by regressing the
proportion SC/ST in 1961 on a dummy for whether there is a bank in the village in 2001; data
on banking facilities or other measures of access to credit was not recorded in the 1951 or 1961
census. The results of this regression are shown in column (7) of Table 1, where we see villages
with a higher proportion of SC/ST population are significantly less likely to have access to
banking facilities.
SCST1961,ip = βx2001,ip + γp
These results suggest that our assumptions about caste, landowning status and access to
capital are plausible. SC/ST households are more likely to be agricultural tenants prior to
reform, and more likely to live in villages without access to capital. Accordingly, they are
more likely to be tenants displaced by new landowners following the implementation of tenancy
reforms.
5 Results
We present three sets of findings. First, we examine the impact of tenancy reform on land
inequality. Second, we evaluate the impact by caste sub-group. Third, we examine labor supply
and wage outcomes. To explore the robustness of the results, we then perform some placebo
tests.
Overall Land Inequality The model predicts that overall land inequality should fall in
villages that have experienced tenancy reform. To assess whether tenancy reform had an impact
on land distribution, our primary equation of interest is of the form:
Yip = βRip + γp + ip (7)
where Yip is a measure of inequality of land distribution in village i in block pair p; Rip is the
number of tenancy reforms, and γp is a fixed effect for the block pair in which village i lies.
There are 522 villages included.16
The results in Panel A of Table 2 show that tenancy reform had a negative and strongly sig-
nificant effect on overall inequality in land distribution measured in different ways.17 Moreover,
16Land reform acts occur at the level of the princely state and then the state. As a recent literature has shown
that inference employing clustered standard errors with a low number of clusters can be even more unreliable
than inference using unclustered heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, we estimate the main specifications
without clustering (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller 2008, Cameron, Gelbach & Miller 2006). However, we have
re-estimated the principal specification (7) for the main outcomes of interest employing a wild bootstrap to
bootstrap the T-statistics within each princely state-state cluster (on this, see Cameron et al. (2008)) add ref.
Our main results remain significant with p-values of 0.15 or below.
17Estimating all the major results presented here with total reform as the independent variable results in
coefficients of roughly equal magnitude, suggesting that abolition and ceiling reforms had no additional impact
on village-level measures of inequality.
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the effect of tenancy reform on aggregate measures such as the Gini and the GE(1) coefficient is
substantial (columns 1 and 2). The mean level of tenancy reform would result in a decrease in
the inequality index of nearly 15%. A decrease in the Gini coefficient of this magnitude would
move a village that was at the median of inequality across all villages to the 35th percentile of
inequality, or move a village from the 65th percentile of inequality to the median.
Columns (3) and (4) show that the proportionate decrease on the percentile land ratios
is larger, 4% and 6% respectively for a marginal tenancy reform event. This suggests that
the bulk of the redistribution is occurring in the middle of the asset distribution, resulting in
relatively more compression in the ratio of land owned by the 75th percentile relative to the
25th percentile as compared to the ratio between the 90th and 10th percentiles. The magnitude
of the effect is again, substantial. The implied decrease in the 75-25 ratio for a village at the
mean level of land reform would move it from the median level of inequality across all villages
to below the minimum level.
We also decompose the GE(1) index to evaluate between-caste group inequality, denoted
as BC(1). Between-caste group inequality, GEb(a), is derived assuming every person within a
given caste group owns the mean quantity of land in that caste group, lk. Column (5) shows
a significant decrease in between-caste group inequality. Perhaps most surprisingly, tenancy
reform has no significant effect on overall landlessness, a result that again indicates the primary
beneficiaries of reforms are not the poorest, landless households (column 6).
Land Inequality by Caste We now use the variant of the model which allowed γ to vary by
caste sub-group to explore how land distribution changes and economic changes varies by caste.
In particular, the model suggests that tenancy reform should have an impact differentially by
sub-group according to whether each group is better placed to purchase land.
To examine whether this is the case, we first examine the distribution of land across upper
caste, OBC and SC/ST. Panel B of Table 2 shows two variables for each caste group. The
first is a dummy equal to one if the proportion of land owned by the caste group in a village
exceeds the median proportion land owned by that group across all villages, and the second is
the proportion of households within that caste group that are landless. The results indicate
that there is a decrease in the proportion of total land held by upper castes and a corresponding
increase in the proportion held by OBC households, with no significant change in total land held
by SC/ST households. The implied magnitude is substantial: at the mean of tenancy reform,
the probability upper caste landholdings are in the upper half of the distribution decreases to
33%, while the probability OBC landholdings are in the upper half of the distribution increases
to 65%.
However, land reform at the mean also increased the proportion of SC/ST households that
are landless by around 13 percentage points on a base probability of 49%, while having no
significant impact on the proportion of upper caste or OBC households that are landless. This
presumably reflects displacement by more productive tenant-turned-landowner as predicted by
the model.
A potentially more accurate way to look at the effects of tenancy reform is to examine
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evidence from household data. Our core specification is now:
Yhip = βRip + γp + ip + µhip (8)
where Yhip denotes a given outcome for household h in village i and block pair p and µhip is the
household-specific error term. Standard errors clustered at the village level to allow for common
shocks.
We consider four outcome variables: the quantity of land owned and leased by the household,
and dummies for the primary source of a household’s income, specifically whether it is from
household cultivation or agricultural labor. We also examine heterogeneity between caste groups
which we believe should reflect access to opportunities to acquire land, such as credit market
opportunities. Thus, the second specification allows tenancy reform to be interacted whether
a household belongs to an OBC or SC/ST caste group. (Upper castes are the omitted base
category.) Specifically, we estimate the following specification:
Yhip = βRip + λ1Rip ∗Ohip + λ2Rip ∗ Ship +Ohip + Ship + γp + ip + µhip (9)
where Ohip and Ship are dummy variables denoting household membership in the two caste
groups.
The results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) shows that there is no significant effect on
the quantity of land owned. However, column (2) shows that this masks some heterogeneity.
Summing the level and interaction effects, the impact for SC/ST households is significant and
negative: at the mean of land reform, their landholdings decrease around 30%. The point
estimate for OBC households is positive but noisy, suggesting their landholdings increase.
Column (3) examines the quantity of land leased. There is a significant decline in the
probability of leasing any land as a result of land reform, though no variation in the size of the
effect across different caste-groups. This is consistent with tenancy reform reducing the value
of leasing land for the landlord.
Taken together, these results suggest that both SC/ST and OBC households experience a
decline in tenancy as a result of land reform. Given that tenancy reforms place a variety of
restrictions on tenancy relationships that render such relationships less attractive to landowners,
it is unsurprising that tenancy rates decline. However, landownership does not necessarily fill
the gap. Only OBC households experience a corresponding increase in ownership, while SC/ST
households also experience a decline in ownership and are thus more likely to be entirely landless.
The coefficients on the dummy variables for the primary source of household income reported
in columns (5) through (8) reinforce these findings. Column (6) shows that tenancy reform leads
to greater owner-cultivation among OBC households, an increase in probability of 10 points on
a base probability of 37%; owner-cultivation among SC/ST households declines. Column (8)
shows that while OBCs are less likely to work as agricultural laborers after a tenancy reform,
the probability that SC/ST households work as agricultural laborers increases from 44% to 54%
at the mean.
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This reinforces the importance of studying the heterogeneous impact of tenancy reform at
the household level, and suggests the effects plausibly depend on the extent to which potential
cultivators can benefit from the possibility of becoming landowners as reform reduces the at-
tractiveness of tenancy to landlords. Estimating the overall welfare effect of tenancy reforms is
thus potentially complex.
Labor Demand and Wages The model predicts that labor demand and wages will be af-
fected by tenancy reform. Table 4 shows regressions employing as the dependent variable a
dummy variable for participation in paid agricultural and non-agricultural labor at the indi-
vidual level, the agricultural and construction wage as reported at the village level, and the
number of factories as reported at the village level. For the regressions employing individual
participation in paid agricultural and non-agricultural labor, we estimate equation (9), used in
previous specifications.
Column (1) shows that, on average, tenancy reform increases participation in paid agricul-
tural labor. There is a 1% increase with each tenancy reform against a base probability of 17%.
Column (2) shows that, for SC/ST households, the increase is more than twice as big.
Columns (3) and (4) look at non-agricultural labor. On average, there is a decline in the
probability of paid non-agricultural labor. This is largest for OBC households (presumably
because they are substituting into own cultivation) and also substantial for SC/ST households
(who seem likely to be substituting into agricultural labor).
Columns (5) and (6) examine the impact on wages. They show that both the agricultural
and construction wage are increased by tenancy reform. The daily agricultural wage increases
around 7% with each episode of land reform, or by 47% at the mean level of land reform. An
increase in the wage is consistent with the results reported by Besley & Burgess (2000), and
consistent with prediction of our model when φ > 1. The increase in the construction wage can
be explained by a leftward shift in the supply curve for non-agricultural labor.
Column (7) shows that that there is no significant effect of land reform on the number of
factories in the village, though the magnitude of the coefficient is substantial (albeit noisily
estimated.) This presumably reflects the interaction of two effects. First, the shift in the supply
curve for non-agricultural labor and the increase in non-agricultural wages would be expected
to result in a decline in the number of factories. On the other hand, higher wages should yield
a positive demand effect for factory output. The results here suggest, albeit tentatively, that
the demand effect dominates. This is in contrast to other papers that have found that rural
industrialization growth is largest in areas where growth in agricultural productivity has been
low (Foster & Rosenzweig 2004).
Placebo tests One potential challenge to the identification strategy is that tenancy reform is
really proxying for other policies that differ at the state level. In order to gain some reassurance
that this is not the case, we estimate a set of regressions that measure the effect of assignment to
a state with higher or lower levels of land reform on various measures of village- and household-
level provision of public goods, and the interaction between land reform and caste dummies.
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We also examine the effect of other types of land reform on measures of village-level inequality.
Specifically, we estimate three parallel equations. The first, at the village level, regresses
a dummy for whether the local government, denoted the gram panchayat or GP, provides a
certain public good in the village, denoted Gip, on land reform and an interaction term with
the proportion of SC/ST households in the village, denoted Prip. Block-pair fixed effects γp are
again employed, and standard errors are clustered at the panchayat level.
Gip = βRip + βRip ∗ Prip + γp + ip (10)
The second equation is at the household level and uses as the outcome a dummy for the
provision of governmental assistance to that household. Analogous to the main specifications,
this equation is estimated with both block-pair fixed effects and village fixed effects as well as
including interaction terms for caste grouping.
Ghip = βRip + λ1Rip ∗Ohip + λ2Rip ∗ Ship +Ohip + Ship + γp + ip + µhip (11)
Ghip = λ1Rip ∗Ohip + λ2Rip ∗ Ship +Ohip + Ship + ηip + µhip (12)
The results of the regressions for provision of public goods are shown in Table 5. They
show no significant coefficient on either total reform or the interaction between reform and the
proportion SC/ST, with the exception of a positive and marginally significant coefficient on the
probability that the panchayat provides funds for repairs of the village school. This suggests
that differential provision of public goods to villages with a higher or lower proportion of SC/ST
households in states with more or less land reform is not a source of bias.
The household-level results are shown in Panel B of the same table, using as the dependent
variable a dummy for whether the household received government aid for household construc-
tion, toilet construction, or the provision of electricity. The results show a positive and signif-
icant coefficient on the interaction between SC/ST and total reform: in other words, SC/ST
households are more likely to receive government assistance with household or toilet construc-
tion in states that have more land reform. This seems intuitive if we consider that these are
likely to be states with more progressive policies in general. The level effect is negative and the
OBC interaction term generally insignificant.
These results indicate that insofar as differential provision of public goods or governmental
assistance in states with more or less reform introduces bias to our results, the bias should be
towards finding a positive effect on the welfare for SC/ST households. The fact that our results
show a strongly negative impact on land ownership and welfare of SC/ST households suggests
that these results can convincingly be attributed to land reform, rather than other governmental
policies.
The third equation of interest simply re-estimates the original equation number (7) used
to identify the impact of tenancy reform, employing an index of abolition and ceiling reforms
as the independent variable. The results shown in Panel C of 5 indicate that abolition and
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ceiling reforms did not decrease inequality, and along some dimensions appear to have increased
inequality. The Gini coefficient and the 75-25 ratio in land both increase as a result of these
reforms, and the probability that the upper castes hold a disproportionate quantity of land is
higher in states with more abolition and ceiling reform events. While evaluating the reasons
for the failure of other forms of land reform is beyond the scope of the paper, these results do
suggest that tenancy reforms are not picking up the impact of other types of accompanying
land reforms.
Summary Taken together, these results suggest an impact of tenancy reform which is consis-
tent with the theoretical model laid out in the last section. There is a fall in overall inequality,
with land ownership increasing among OBC households. On the other hand, there is greater
supply of labor among SC/ST households who are less likely to be tenants or landowners after
land reform. In addition, agricultural wages have increased. Placebo tests indicate that these
shifts are not attributable to other policies that may have varied at the state level.
6 Conclusion
Poor rural economies are second-best in many ways. It is no surprise, therefore, that tracing
the impact of a single dimension of reform can be complex. The analysis in this paper has
looked at a number of dimensions on which we might expect tenancy reform to have an impact,
exploiting a natural experiment due to state reorganizations to trace the impact of reform at the
village and household level. A novel feature of the analysis is the relatively long time horizon
over which we are able to assess the effects of the reform.
While tenancy reform was implemented with the goal of strengthening the position of ten-
ants, several equilibrium responses need to be considered. In the context that we have studied,
tenancy reform did produce significant and highly persistent shifts in land distribution. How-
ever, the benefits of reform were lopsided and favored relatively wealthier tenants, while SC/ST
households saw a decrease in land holdings and generally became more reliant on agricultural
labor. On the other hand, we document a substantial increase in agricultural wages, due to
an increase in demand for hired labor from large landholders no longer relying on tenants, a
shift in the labor supply curve, or both. Thus, while the welfare impacts of tenancy reforms are
substantial and long-lasting, their impact is heterogeneous between types of cultivators. These
results can best be understood through the lens of a fairly standard model where owners of land
are seeking the best opportunities for exploiting their land.
The question of how best to regulate the land market is still a pressing one in many devel-
oping economies. Mexico has embarked on major experiments in rural land titling over the last
decade (de Janvry, Gonzalez-Navarro & Sadoulet 2011). Rural land rights remain extremely
limited in China, where the role of property rights in rural development is hotly contested and
has become an increasing source of political unrest. In addition, many other developing coun-
tries face challenges in how to appropriately negotiate compensation for rural landowners when
industrialization requires the purchase or expropriation of land (Bardhan 2011). In all such
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cases, it is essential to understand in detail, as we have done here, the equilibrium responses
to reform and the way that these responses create gainers and losers. This can only be done
employing a sufficiently long time horizon over which the full effects of reform become visible.
In a broad sense, our findings offer a stark reminder of the hazards of piecemeal policy
reform in a second-best world. For example, if tenancy persists in part due to a lack of credit
market opportunities to become an owner-cultivator, then increasing the power of tenants may
result in some tenants being forced to become landless laborers. However, whether these former
tenants are in fact worse off will also depend on the strength of factor market equilibrium
responses, primarily the wage response. Asset data suggests that, at least in our context, the
wage response was unable to sufficiently compensate the SC/ST households. The complexity of
factor market responses should contribute to a recognition by policymakers that, while short-
run political imperatives may provide the impetus for reform, the long-run economic changes
are what matter for development.18
18In this context, it is relevant to point to the rise of Naxal violence in India. Since 2003, more than 2,500
people in India have been killed in Naxalite violence while 7,000 incidents of violence involving Naxalites have
been reported. The key policy reform demanded by these groups is increased redistribution of lands to SC and
ST groups. Naxalite presence is highest in Indian districts with a high fraction of landless laborers (Planning
Commission of India report).
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Figure 1: Map of sample districts
22
Table 1: Land reform and initial land structure
Tenancy All block pairs Prop. SC/ST
Land structure Capital access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Laborer .633 .152
(2.247) (.065)∗∗
Tenant -.795 .037
(2.333) (.094)
Owner-cultivator -1.291 -.083
(2.082) (.055)
Landlord -.098
(.127)
Bank access -.062
(.034)∗
Same block pair -.032
(.019)∗
Fixed effects Block-pair State-pair Block-pair Block-pair Block-pair Block-pair None
Obs. 302 302 295 295 295 295 234
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. The
first column shows the results of a regression of tenancy reforms post-independence on the the proportion of the
agricultural population that falls into the specified occupational category in the 1951 census. The second column
tests the linguistic closeness of matched-pair. Columns 3-6 show regressions of the proportion of the population
that is SC/ST in the 1961 census on the specified occupational category in the 1951 census. Column 7 shows
a regression of the proportion of the population that is SC/ST in the 1961 census on a dummy for whether a
cooperative or commercial bank is present in the village in the 1961 census.
Table 2: Inequality and land distribution
Gini GE(1) 90/10 75/25 BC(1) Prop. landless
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Tenancy -.009 -.018 -1.335 -.772 -.014 -.004
(.003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.672)∗∗ (.310)∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)
Mean .527 .620 34.493 13.048 .336 .211
Obs. 504 504 504 504 504 504
Panel B
Upper caste OBC SC/ST
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenancy -.025 -.004 .019 -.003 .006 .019
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005) (.006)∗∗∗ (.006) (.004) (.010)∗
Mean .505 .215 .516 .456 .507 .499
Obs. 504 504 504 504 504 504
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include block-pair fixed effects. Asterisks indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. In Panel A, the outcome variables are the Gini coefficient, GE(1)
coefficient, 90-10 ratio, 75-25 ratio, and between-caste GE(1) ratio in land inequality, and the proportion of the
population that is landless. In Panel B, for each caste group the first column shows results for a dummy variable
equal to one if the proportion of land owned by the given caste group exceeds the median proportion owned by
the same caste group across all villages. The second column shows the coefficient for the proportion of households
in that caste group that are landless.
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Table 4: Labor supply and wages
Agri. labor Non agri. labor
Level Int. effects Level Int. effects Ag. wage Cons. wage Factories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tenancy .009 .004 -.009 -.006 4.565 4.407 .028
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.283)∗∗∗ (.539)∗∗∗ (.019)
SCST int. .016 -.004
(.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
OBC int. -.001 -.012
(.002) (.001)∗∗∗
SC/ST .216 .114 .002 .024
(.006)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.004) (.007)∗∗∗
OBC .077 .098 .026 .124
(.007)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Mean .166 .166 .057 .057 58.906 81.568 .306
Obs. 24016 24016 24016 24016 478 402 480
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include block-pair fixed effects. Asterisks indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. The dependent variables are first, dummy variables for participation
in paid agricultural and non-agricultural labor, followed by village-level regressions employing the agricultural
wage, the construction wage and the number of factories as reported in a survey on village facilities.
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Table 5: Placebo tests
Panel A: Village provision of public goods
School repair Health center repair Health salaries Health materials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tenancy -.002 -.002 .009 .017 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.004
(.012) (.015) (.006) (.011) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.004)
SC/ST prop. int. .003 -.027 .0006 .004
(.029) (.022) (.003) (.004)
Mean .441 .441 .078 .078 .004 .004 .006 .006
Obs. 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504
Panel B: Village provision of public assistance to households
Construction Toilet Electricity Water
Level Int. effects Level Int. effects Level Int. effects Level Int. effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tenancy .007 -.005 -.006 -.015 -.014 -.018 -.0002 -.00009
(.004)∗ (.003) (.003)∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.0007) (.0007)
SC/ST int. .036 .025 .007 -.00008
(.006)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.006) (.0006)
OBC int. .002 .013 .015 -.0004
(.005) (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.0007)
Mean .186 .186 .059 .059 .156 .156 .009 .009
Obs. 4579 4579 4579 4579 4579 4579 4579 4579
Panel C: Other land reform legislation
Gini GE(1) 90/10 75/25 Prop. landless BC(1) Upper prop. OBC prop.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Other reform .005 -.012 .669 .931 -.025 -.005 .006 -.038
(.009) (.020) (2.132) (.982) (.012)∗∗ (.013) (.019) (.020)∗
Tenancy -.008 -.020 -1.223 -.615 -.018 -.005 -.024 .013
(.003)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.858) (.389) (.005)∗∗∗ (.005) (.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗
Mean .527 .620 34.493 13.048 .336 .211 .505 .516
Obs. 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 490
Note: standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include block-pair fixed effects. Asterisks indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. In Panel A, the dependent variables are dummies for whether the
panchayat provided any funds toward the specified educational or health public good, and SC/ST prop. int. is
an interaction between the proportion of the village population that is SC/ST and the tenancy variable. In Panel
B, the dependent variables are dummies for whether a household participated in a public assistance scheme for
the specified home improvement. In Panel C, the dependent variables are the indices of land inequality employed
in Table 2, and a dummy for whether the proportion of land held by OBC and SC/ST is above the median, as
in Panel B of the same table. The independent variables are an index of abolition and ceiling reforms and an
index of tenancy reforms.
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Appendices
A Sampling methods
We selected four pairs of districts formerly in the same princely state that were incorporated
into two different states. Bidar and Medak in Hyderabad were incorporated into Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh, respectively. In the Madras presidency, there are three such pairs: South
Kanara (Karnataka) and Kasaragod (Kerala), Pallakad (Kerala) and Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu),
and Dharmapuri (Tamil Nadu) and Chittoor (Andhra Pradesh.) Given that Mysore was com-
pletely incorporated into Karnataka, there are no district-pairs in which both districts were for-
merly part of Mysore state. However, Kolar district in Mysore and subsequently in Karnataka
was also surveyed, and matched on the basis of language, as detailed below, with Chittoor dis-
trict in Andhra Pradesh and Dharmapuri in Tamil Nadu. All three districts form a contiguous
geographic region. The core of the sample thus constitutes
In order to select the block pairs employed in this analysis, blocks within the paired districts
were matched on the basis of linguistic compatibility. For each block pair of block i and block j,
a measure of linguistic compatibility Li was constructed using the following formula. Pli denotes
the proportion of the population in block i speaking a given language, 19 and Ni denotes the
population in a given block. Thus Li equals the sum of the difference in the proportion of
population speaking each language across the two blocks, each weighted by the proportion of
the population that speaks that language in both blocks taken as a whole. The minimum
possible value of the index of linguistic compatibility, indicating the best possible match, is
zero; the maximum is one.
Li(vi, vj) =
18∑
l=1
(Pli − Plj) ∗ Pli ∗Ni + Plj ∗Nj
Ni +Nj
(13)
For each district pair, the set of all possible block pairs is ranked and the top three unique
pairs are chosen. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the quality of match for all possible
block pairs for each pair of districts. On average, block pairs show the highest degree of lin-
guistic compatibility across Kolar and Chittoor districts, and the lowest degree of compatibility
in Coimbatore and Palakkad districts. The other four district pairs have similar levels of lan-
guage matching. The high quality of the matches between Kolar and Chittoor and Kolar and
Dharmapuri districts indicates that despite the fact that these district pairs were not previously
part of the same princely state, their ethnolinguistic composition is comparable.
Blocks are divided into village government units or gram panchayats (GPs), consisting of 1
to 6 villages. In the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka, six gram panchayats
were randomly sampled from each block selected. Gram panchayats in Kerala are larger than
those in other states, and thus three GPs were sampled in each block in Kerala. All villages
19The languages reported are Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Marathi,
Mayalayam, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu.
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Table 1: Linguistic compatibility across district-pairs
District pair Mean Li Median Li Std. dev.
Bidar-Medak 0.47 0.46 0.09
Chittoor-Dharmapuri 0.58 0.65 0.20
Dakasinna-Kasaragod 0.47 0.43 0.21
Coimbatore-Palakkad 0.74 0.73 0.13
Chittoor-Kolar 0.28 0.27 0.16
Dharmapuri-Kolar 0.52 0.57 0.19
in each GP were sampled in AP, TN and KA if the GP had three or fewer villages; if there
were more than three villages, then the village that was the home of the president of the gram
panchayat was sampled in addition to two other randomly selected villages. (For the purposes
of the sampling frame, villages with a population of less than 200 were excluded; all hamlets
with a population over 200 are considered independent villages.) In Kerala, villages are again
much larger and thus wards, the subunit of villages, were directly sampled. Six wards in each
GP were randomly selected. This generates a total sample of 527 villages.
B Inequality Measures
The Gini measure is defined as follows, where li denotes the land owned by household i, ri is
the ranking of household i according to land holdings among all households in the village, l¯ is
mean land held in a village and n is the total number of households:
Gini = 1 +
1
n
− 2
l¯n2
n∑
i=1
(n− ri + 1)(li) (14)
The general entropy measures with a=1 and a=2 are calculated using the following equations:
GE(a) =
1
a(a− 1)
[[
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
li
l¯
)a]
− 1
]
(15)
C Land reform in southern India
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